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Permanent Establishment in the Digital Age: 
Improving and Stimulating Debate Through an 
Access to Markets Proxy Approach 
By Benjamin Hoffart*
¶1 The contemporary international tax system developed to allocate taxing jurisdiction 
over buyers and sellers of tangible, physical goods.  Accordingly, the current system is 
based on the actual geographic location of these buyers and sellers.  The Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the preeminent international tax 
policymaker,1 has incorporated and consistently reaffirmed these physical presence 
principles in its Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (“OECD 
Convention”), the predominant world-wide model for bi- and multi-lateral tax treaties. 
The bright line principle established under the current OECD Convention states that “an 
enterprise in one state shall not be subject to a direct tax on its business profits based on 
net income in the other state unless it carries on business in that other state through a 
permanent establishment (“PE”) located in the other state.”2    The OECD Convention 
further establishes fundamental criteria for determining if a permanent establishment 
exists: 
(1) there must be a fixed place of business (situs test); 
(2) the fixed place of business must be located [in a] certain territorial area (locus 
test); 
(3) the use of the fixed place of business must last for a certain period of time 
(tempus test); 
(4) the taxpayer must have a certain right of use [over] the fixed place of 
business (ius test); and 
(5) the activities performed through the fixed place of business must be of a 
business character, as defined in the treaty law and in the domestic tax laws 
(business activity test).  3
Finally, if a company does not meet these standards, PE status may still be imputed if an 
agent of the company regularly conducts business in the non-resident jurisdiction.    4
 
* Candidate for J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2008. 
1 See e.g.  Arthur J. Cockfield, The Rise of the OECD as Informal World Tax Organization Through 
National Responses to E-Commerce Tax Challenges, 8 YALE J. L. & TECH. 136 (2006) [hereinafter 
Cockfield, Rise of the OECD]. 
2 Gary D. Sprague & Rachel Hersey, Permanent Establishments And Internet-Enabled Enterprises: The 
Physical Presence and Contract Concluding Dependent Agent Tests, 38 GA. L. REV. 299, 299 (2003). 
3 Cristián Gárate, The Fixed Place of Business in the Context of Electronic Commerce, in PERMANENT 
ESTABLISHMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 41, 45 (Hans-Jörgen Aigner & Mario Züger eds., 2003); 
see also Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income 
and on Capital, art. 5(1), 7(1), Jan. 28, 2003[hereinafter OECD Model Convention, 2003]. 
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¶2 The importance of permanent establishment within the contemporary treaty-heavy 
international taxation system is that “[w]hen a treaty governs the tax relations between [a] 
foreigner’s country of residence and the country which is his host, ‘permanent 
establishment’ supplants the taxing nexus of the domestic tax law of the host country.”5 
A foreign person or business that does not have adequate contacts sufficient to trigger the 
OECD standards creating a permanent establishment is exempt from taxes on business 
income and will pay taxes on investment income at a reduced rate.6  As a result, 
determining “when the foreigner arrives at the crucial point [creating a permanent 
establishment] becomes a question of enormous financial significance.”  7
¶3 The OECD Model does not define “fixed place of business,” the crucial point in 
determining whether a non-resident’s activities in a host jurisdiction are sufficient to 
create a permanent establishment.  Accordingly, the term has been applied according to 
legal doctrine, case law, and revisions to the OECD Commentary since its inception. 
These interpretations allowed the “fixed place of business” terminology to adapt to 
changes occurring in the traditional business world, but Internet-based influences in the 
modern economy have resulted in hermeneutic confusion.  8
¶4 The advent of the Internet, and especially the proliferation of e-commerce, has led 
many commentators to question the OECD’s use of permanent establishment as the 
defining nexus by which a country may tax the business profits of a nonresident entity.9  
These arguments are based on the idea that while permanent establishment was an 
effective criterion in the pre-digital age when cross-border commerce required a physical 
presence to conduct business, this criterion is no longer viable in an age where 
technology allows buyers and sellers to conduct cross-border business without ever 
establishing a physical presence in a non-resident state.  These criticisms are 
accompanied by a diverse array of reform suggestions including PE status determined by 
economic rather than physical nexus  and e-commerce withholding taxes.10 11  Despite the 
frequent calls for change, the OECD and other tax theorists maintain that the current PE 
rules are robust and flexible enough to respond to the challenges presented by the digital 
economy.  12
 
4 OECD Model Convention, 2003, supra note 3, at art. 5(5). 
5 John Huston & Lee Williams, PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENTS: A PLANNING PRIMER, 1 (1993). 
6 Id. at 2. 
7 Id. 
8 Gárate, supra note 3, at 45. 
9 See e.g. Charles E. McLure Jr., Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Economic Objectives, 
Technological Constraints, and Tax Laws, 52 TAX L. REV. 269 (1997); Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation 
of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 425 (1997) [hereinafter Hellerstein, State Taxation]; Arthur J. 
Cockfield, Designing Tax Policy for the Digital Biosphere: How the Internet is Changing Tax Laws, 34 
CONN. L. REV. 333 (2002)[hereinafter Cockfield, Digital Biosphere]; Catherine L. Mann, Balancing Issues 
and Overlapping Jurisdictions in the Global Electronic Marketplace: The UCITA Example, 8  WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 215 (2002); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX 
LAWYER 507 (1997) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of E-Commerce]; Richard L. 
Doernberg, Electronic Commerce and International Tax Sharing, 16 TAX NOTES INT’L 1013 (1998); 
Sprague & Hersey, supra note 2. 
10 See McLure, supra note 9, at 295; Hellerstein, State Taxation, supra note 9, at 440-41. 
11 See Arthur J. Cockfield, Balancing National Interests in the Taxation of Electronic Commerce 
Business Profits, 74 TUL. L. REV. 133, 205-209 (1999); Doernberg, supra note 9, at 1017-18. 
12 OECD Model Convention, 2003, supra note 3, at Introduction ¶ 35; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax 
Competition and E- Commerce, Worldwide Tax Daily, Sept. 17, 2001, available at LEXIS, 2001 WTD 
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¶5 This comment will consider the issue of the permanent establishment in the Internet 
economy from a new perspective:  the permanent establishment as a proxy for access to 
the market.  The “location of value-creation” perspective of the permanent establishment 
rules adopted by many commentators has suggested that for taxing purposes income from 
e-commerce should be allocated by point of sale or consumption.  Moving from this 
angle to a model using the assumption that the traditional, physical presence test was 
intended by tax policymakers as a means of approximating a non-resident company’s 
access to a host country’s market also largely supports allocation by point of sale or 
consumption.  Thus, the “market proxy approach” supports many of the revisions to 
current PE practices advocated by commentators applying the “location of value 
creation” approach.  While the practical outcome of each justification may be the same, 
the approach advocated in this comment provides different and potentially more complete 
justifications for these reforms.  
¶6 Part I of this comment traces the history and theoretical basis for the modern 
conception of permanent establishment.  Cognizant of this background, Part II continues 
by reviewing recent suggestions for reform or maintenance of the current PE rules and 
usage.  Part III argues that suggestions for reform based in “access to markets proxy” 
rather than the currently predominant “location of value creation” frame yield more 
robust reform proposals, and uses this access to markets proxy to re-examine and refine 
current reform arguments.  Part III also shows how the access to markets approach 
stimulates further discussion and consideration of how the ill-defined world of 
cyberspace relates to our traditional, tangible world. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT AS A MEANS OF 
ASSIGNING TAXING JURISDICTION 
¶7 The concept of permanent establishment developed in the late 19th century in 
conjunction with the rapidly evolving business climate sometimes referred to as the 
“second industrial revolution.”13  This period was characterized by increases in business 
mobility not entirely dissimilar to the recent Internet-influenced changes to the 
commercial environment.  Between 1870 and 1920, capital of “industrialized countries 
changed from being predominantly circulating capital (working capital) to capital 
invested in plants, machines, etc. (fixed capital).”14  This transformation of capital was 
accompanied by a transportation revolution as improvements in railroads and steamships 
and the advent of the automobile dramatically decreased transportation time and cost.15  
While these changes drastically changed fiscal mobility, industrial mobility remained 
 
180-11 [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition] (noting that it has been more difficult than initially 
expected for multi-national enterprises to avoid having permanent establishments by relying on e-
commerce); Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of E-Commerce, supra note 9, at 516; Sprague & Hersey, 
supra note 2, at 311 (acknowledging that while e-commerce has changed the business world, the origin of 
wealth for businesses remains where it always has, at the place where the costs and risks to develop, 
produce, and distribute the products are borne). 
13 Arvid A. Skaar, PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT, 65 (1991). 
14 Id. 
15 See id. at 66. 
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limited to the transportation industry.16  “It appears, therefore, that PE as an international 
fiscal concept emerged at a time when production factors were relatively immobile[.]”  17
¶8 “After World War I when governments were in dire need of revenue to rebuild their 
economies, they began to try to tax the earnings of the visiting businessman and the 
profits of the foreign company on goods sold through him.”18  In the 1920’s, the League 
of Nations addressed the pernicious double taxation of non-resident companies’ business 
profits.19  Reports submitted to the League of Nations in 1923 and 1925 highlighted a 
special need for mechanisms preventing double taxation of these profits.20  In 1927 and 
1928, the League of Nations responded to the reports’ recommendations with drafts of 
the Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation,21 introducing the concept 
of permanent establishment as a means of allocating taxing jurisdiction among states with 
a potential claim to taxing rights.22 “Within the traditional economic context of this 
theory a material or physical transaction took place if a natural or juridical person 
developed tangible economical activities in a certain territory for a minimum period of 
time.”23  This “fundamental structure for international taxation of income announced 
nearly seven decades ago in the 1928 League of Nations Model Treaty forms the 
common basis for more than twelve hundred bilateral tax treaties now in force throughout 
the world.”  24
¶9 The permanent establishment rules first promulgated by the League of Nations in 
1928 and currently embodied in the OECD’s Model Convention are well situated in 
source models of taxation.25  “The claim of source countries to tax income produced 
within their borders is analogous to a nation’s long-recognized claim of sovereignty over 
natural resources within its boundaries.”26  Source-based justifications for taxation also 
hold that countries have “a fair claim to the income produced within [their] borders[.] 
[F]oreigners, whose activities reach some minimum threshold, should contribute to the 
 
16 Id. at 67. 
17 Id. 
18 Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation, 46 
DUKE L.J. 1021, 1088 (1997). 
19 See  Philip Postlewaite, Samuel Donaldson, & Allison Christians, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL 
TAXATION (forthcoming Nov. 2007) (“One of the most fundamental issues of international taxation is the 
potential for double taxation that exists due to the movement of people and transactions across borders. 
Double taxation is considered to be so distortive of efficient economic behavior that most countries, 
including the United States, have addressed it statutorily ... The issue of double taxation is also addressed in 
treaties entered into with other countries, usually on a bilateral basis.”) 
20 See, e.g., Report on Double Taxation, League of Nations Doc. E.F.S.73.F.19 (1923) (reporting 
findings of Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman and Sir Josiah Stamp to Financial Committee of the 
League of Nations) [hereinafter 1923 LON Report]; see also Technical Experts on Double Taxation and 
Tax Evasion, League of Nations Doc. F. 212 (1925) [hereinafter 1925 LON Report]. 
21 Double Taxation and Tax Evasion Report, League of Nations Doc. C.216.M.85 1927 II (1927) 
[hereinafter 1927 LON Report]; see also Report Presented by the General Meeting of Government Experts 
on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.562 M.178 1928 II (1928) [hereinafter 
1928 LON Report] (amending the Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation first 
presented in the 1927 LON Report). 
22 1927 LON Report, supra note 21, at 10. 
23 Gárate, supra note 3, at 43. 
24 Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 18, at 1023. 
25 See Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing International Income: Inadequate 
Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 298 (2001). 
26 Id. at 298; see also Blair Downey, E-Commerce: The Taxman’s Nemesis, 2 ASPER. REV. INT’L BUS. & 
TRADE L. 53, 61 (2002)(“Traditional source-based systems are deeply connected to PE”). 
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costs of services provided by the host government.”27  This “social contract” view also 
evokes the cost and benefit theories of taxation which say that taxpayers should pay the 
state for the cost of state-provided services or in accordance with specific benefits 
received by the taxpayer.   28
¶10 In light of the theoretical bases for the permanent establishment rules, and the 
emergence of PE in the early twentieth century “when significant international commerce 
in foreign markets required the creation of a branch or similar physical presence,”29 many 
tax commentators have determined that “the conceptual basis for allocating taxable 
income [under the PE rules] was the location of value-creating activity”30 or source of 
taxable profits.31  This basis for the permanent establishment rules was almost 
immediately tested by the advent of radio and television marketing.32  Even though radio 
and television were not easily subjected to direct taxes, since stations’ profits resulted 
from advertising sales rather than direct charges on listeners and viewers, the 
proliferation of analog media did not significantly challenge the PE rules due to the 
implicit assumption that consumption consisted primarily of tangible products sold by 
those advertising merchants.    33
¶11 Nevertheless, the increasing mismatch between law and technology continued to 
challenge the appropriateness of physical nexus requirements like those embodied in the 
permanent establishment rules.34  In 1967, a question of taxing jurisdiction over multi-
state business profits reached the United States Supreme Court.  In National Bellas 
Hess,35 a case involving a mail order company conducting business in a State where it 
had no physical presence, the Court reaffirmed physical presence requirements indicative 
of the broader theoretical justifications for the PE rules.36  Twenty-five years later, in 
1992, the Court re-examined its Bella Hess holding in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,37 
another case involving an attempt by a State to tax the mail order profits of a company 
with no physical connection to the State.  In Quill, the lower court declined to follow 
Bellas Hess because innovations of the prior quarter century rendered its holding 
“obsolete.”   While the majority reaffirmed its Bellas Hess holding, Justice White noted 38
 
27 Graetz, supra note 25, at 298. 
28 Sprague & Hersey, supra note 2, at 304-305; see also Thomas S. Adams, The Taxation of Business, 
11 NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROC. 185, 186 (1917) (arguing that because providing and maintaining a market 
costs money, those costs should be distributed amongst those benefiting from that market). 
29 Arthur J. Cockfield, Transforming the Internet into a Taxable Forum: A Case Study in E-Commerce 
Taxation, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1171, 1179 (2001) [hereinafter Cockfield, Transforming]. 
30 Sprague & Hersey, supra note 2, at 302. 
31 See Cockfield, Transforming, supra note 29, at 1180 (highlighting how PE principles represented a 
balanced rule from an international equity perspective since source countries could obtain revenue from 
profits created by commercial opportunities presented by their markets). 
32 See McLure, supra note 9, at 293. 
33 McLure, supra note 9, at 293-294. 
34 See Arthur J. Cockfield, Jurisdiction to Tax: A Law and Technology Perspective, 38 GA. L. REV. 85, 
92 (2003)[hereinafter Cockfield, Jurisdiction to Tax]; Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and 
Consumption in the New Economy: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 38 GA. L. REV. 1, 41 
(2003)[hereinafter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income]. 
35 Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
36 Id. at 758 (“But the Court has never held that a State may impose the duty of use tax collection and 
payment upon a seller whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or the 
United States mail.”). 
37 Quill, Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
38 North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 208 (N.D. 1991). 
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in his dissent that “in today’s economy, physical presence frequently has very little to do 
with a transaction a State might seek to tax.”  39
¶12 While Justice White expressed the minority opinion of the Court in Quill, his 
argument that physical presence had little meaning for taxing jurisdiction seems to be 
echoed by a majority of contemporary tax scholars.  Professor Hellerstein notes, “if there 
is one proposition with which virtually all observers agree, it is that the way in which 
income is generated in the ‘new economy’ is materially different from the way it was 
generated during the formative era of international income tax rules.”40  The change with 
the greatest impact on traditional taxation structures has been the development of the 
Internet, “a decentralized, global, and rapidly evolving network that often transmits 
intangible goods and services[, and is] highly resistant to traditional forms of government 
regulation.”41  In 1996, The United States Treasury office commented on the changing 
commercial environment: 
Electronic commerce, on the other hand, may be conducted without regard to 
national boundaries and may dissolve the link between an income-producing 
activity and a specific location. From a certain perspective, electronic commerce 
doesn’t seem to occur in any physical location but instead takes place in the 
nebulous world of “cyberspace.”  Persons engaged in electronic commerce could 
be located anywhere in the world and their customers will be ignorant of, or 
indifferent to, their location.42
¶13 Given the “nebulous” nature of cyberspace, many commentators43 have noted how 
e-commerce fundamentally challenges physical presence-based permanent establishment 
rules.  If permanent establishment principles are to remain effective in the new economy, 
the fundamental PE components developed for the old economy — place of business, 
location, and permanency — must be reconciled with the new digital reality.44  Perhaps 
the greatest difficulty of applying traditional permanent establishment principles in the e-
commerce sense is finding a component45 of the Internet the effectively meets the OECD 
Model Convention’s requirements for PE status.    46
 
39 Quill, 504 U.S. at 328 (White, J., dissenting). 
40 Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income, supra note 34, at 41. 
41 Cockfield, Transforming, supra note 29, at 1173. 
42 Deptartment of the Treasury, OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, SELECTED TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF 
GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, 7.2.3.1 (1996), http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-
policy/library/internet.pdf [hereinafter 1996 Treasury Department Report]; see also Gárate, supra note 3, at 
48-49 (“[The] Internet creates an almost instantaneous interactivity that is virtual (non physical), global 
(borderless), anonymous (difficult to track), non intermediated (impersonal), closely integrated and 
specialized across borders; it is an alternative to business conducted through traditional channels.”). 
43 See generally sources cited supra note 9. 
44 Gárate, supra note 3, at 51. 
45 The 1996 Treasury Department Report highlights how PE principles apply to one specific Internet 
component, the server.  In the report, the Department notes that computer servers can be easily located 
anywhere in the world and users of these servers are indifferent to the server’s location. Servers are often 
not involved in the creation of income so as to be considered in determining whether a trade or business 
exists, and servers are mobile, so businesses can potentially locate their servers outside high-tax 
jurisdictions (i.e., tax avoidance) if they are given PE status.  1996 Treasury Department Report, supra note 
42. 
46 Downey, supra note 26 at 58; see also OECD Model Convention, supra note 3 and accompanying 
text; Gárate, supra note 3, at 49 (“[T]he situs test needs to be revised to include the new technological situs 
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¶14 In 2000, the OECD responded to this major impediment to the use of traditional PE 
rules in the Model Convention, and made changes to the Convention’s Commentary47 on 
Article 5.48  This revised Commentary clarifies key issues about how indistinct or 
difficult to understand Internet components should be considered under current PE 
principles.49  While the OECD has responded to the questions posed by the digital 
economy through changes to the Model Convention’s Commentary, they have stopped 
short of modifying the current PE system and have advocated that the traditional PE 
concepts will adequately respond to the evolving modern economy. 
II.  CURRENT ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE VIABILITY OF THE CURRENT USE AND 
CONCEPTION OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT 
A.  Arguments For Changing the Current Permanent Establishment Rules 
¶15 This section briefly outlines the prevalent arguments for economic nexus-based 
allocation of taxing jurisdiction at the point of consumption while also considering some 
of the better-developed ancillary e-commerce tax policy recommendations stemming 
from these arguments.  As e-commerce has sparked considerable debate over the 
continued viability of the PE rules, numerous reform suggestions have appeared in the tax 
policy and law literature.  Generally speaking, suggestions for improving allocation of 
taxing jurisdiction in an era of flourishing electronic commerce advocate a move away 
from PE standards using physical presence tests towards PE standards using tests of 
economic presence  at the location of consumption.   50 51
 
in the forms of a server and web sites.  The locus test needs to be reconsidered to comprise new locations ... 
in the form of ... Intranets, Extranets, and the Internet.  The tempus test needs to be analyzed to support 
economic operations that are performed instantaneously between several parties.  Likewise, human 
intervention comprised in the original concept of permanent establishment needs to be revised in the light 
of fully electronic equipment that performs instructions with a code or program denominated [s]oftware.”). 
47 Cockfield, Transforming, supra note 29, at 1189 (“The OECD Commentaries are important because 
they are used by tax authorities and courts, including U.S. courts, to interpret tax treaty provisions.”). 
48 See OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, CLARIFICATION ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PERMANENT 
ESTABLISHMENT DEFINITION IN E-COMMERCE: CHANGES TO THE COMMENTARY ON THE MODEL TAX 
CONVENTION ARTICLE 5 (2000), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/32/1923380.pdf [hereinafter OECD E-
Commerce Clarification Report] (last visited Nov. 21, 2006); see also Michael Dezsi, U.S. Taxation of 
International E-Commerce: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s New 
Commentary to its Model Tax Convention Redefining Permanent Establishment, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. 
REV. 123 (2001). 
49 The new Commentary provides the following guidance: (1) web sites are composed of software and 
data, not tangible property, and therefore cannot be considered a place of business sufficient for 
characterization as a PE; (2) a server may rise to the level of a PE since it is tangible property that requires 
a physical location and that location can be considered a fixed place of business regardless if the server is 
owned or leased by the business operating the server; (3) presence of business personnel at the location of 
the server is not necessary to create a PE; (4) if the server is operated by a web provider, it should not 
constitute a permanent establishment because the business has no control over the server and it is not a 
place of business of the enterprise; (5) it doesn’t matter that a server can be moved, it is important if it says 
in one location for more than 12 months; (6) computer equipment if a fixed place does not create a PE 
when the business conducted through it is limited to auxiliary services (auxiliary services being defined on 
a case-by-case basis with regard for all the business functions performed through the computer equipment); 
and (7) when the business uses the computer equipment for essential/significant activities they create a PE.  
OECD E-Commerce Clarification Report, supra note 48, at ¶¶ 42.2-42.10. 
50 Charles McLure succinctly states, “Basing nexus on physical presence probably does not make sense 
in the digital age ... ‘economic nexus’ would be a more appropriate concept.”  McLure, supra note 9, at 
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¶16   As detailed in the prior section, Internet-based businesses might allow non-
resident entities to reap considerable gains from sales in another jurisdiction without 
having sufficient physical presence in the jurisdiction to give it PE status.52  Accordingly, 
commentators have argued that the fundamental concept — profit should be attributed to 
the location where value is created — used by the OECD is obsolete.53  The appropriate 
test should not be based solely on wealth-creating activities, but should also consider 
place of consumption.  54
¶17 Arthur Cockfield, perhaps the most prolific author of e-commerce tax literature, 
argues that  
the United States and other OECD member states have, despite assertions that 
traditional tax principles must be preserved, moved toward an economic presence 
test for cross-border e-commerce income tax purposes, a significant departure 
from traditional international tax principles that focused on the need for a 
physical presence within a taxing state.55
Cockfield points out that the OECD member states have already significantly diluted the 
traditional permanent establishment principle for e-commerce activities by agreeing (in 
the revised Commentary to the OECD Model Convention) that certain physical aspects of 
the network can, in some circumstances lead to a taxable presence within a foreign 
country.    56
¶18 This change, Cockfield argues, along with tentatively proposed OECD rules to 
govern the amount of profits that should be allocated to a server for tax purposes by 
determining what substantive economic activities are being conducted by the server, 
“may lead to a fundamental shift in the approach used by taxpayers and tax authorities in 
their efforts to allocate profits among activities in different countries.”57  The primary 
change Cockfield forecasts is that tax authorities will no longer ask what sort of taxable 
presence exists within each country, but instead will ask what type of economic activity 
is occurring in each country.58  This effectively allows profits to be diverted away from 
countries that have a meaningful connection to profit-making activities, and the 
increasing complexity surrounding taxpayer compliance strategies (i.e., tax avoidance 
and tax competition) might actually undermine the international income tax system.59  In 
short “[b]y clinging to traditional principles, United States tax authorities and OECD 
 
295; see also Mann, supra note 9, at 231-32 (“Physical presence is much less important in value creation 
for information-rich and network-based productions.”). 
51 See Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 9, at 395. 
52 See Doernberg, supra note 9. 
53 See sources cited supra note 9. 
54 See Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 9. 
55 Id. at 390-391. 
56 Id. at 391 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 391-392. 
59 Id. at 395; see also Arthur J. Cockfield, The Law and Economics of Digital Taxation: Challenges to 
Traditional Tax Laws and Principles, 56 BULL. FOR INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 606, 606 (2002) 
[hereinafter Cockfield, Law and Economics]. 
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member State tax authorities have inhibited the ability of their tax systems to protect real 
world norms.”  60
¶19 A more sensible solution would focus on the location of consumption, rather than 
the location of production.   Cockfield notes, 61
The use of location of consumption to allocate tax revenues to importing 
countries can be justified under a number of theories, including the fact that e-
commerce importing countries created the market opportunities that enabled the 
profits to be made through the cross-border transaction (for example, by 
subsidizing the physical network infrastructure within their country that 
permitted the transaction to go forward).62
Allocating revenues to the location of consumption also combats income shifting and tax 
competition fostered by the OECD’s revised Commentary allowing servers to rise to the 
level of permanent establishments:   
The act of consumption requires a real human being who must necessarily be 
situated somewhere in geographic space, whereas the act of production of 
intangible assets can be diverted to a location that does not have any meaningful 
connection to any real value-adding economic activity.63
¶20 Interestingly, Cockfield suggests that the unique aspects of the Internet be 
harnessed as a solution to the challenges presented by e-commerce.64  Tax authorities 
should identify the critical values they wish to see preserved, such as the desire to 
maintain their ability to collect taxes to pay for public goods.  Then, regulators should see 
if Internet technological solutions can help preserve those values.  Cockfield points to the 
efforts of The Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP), which ran a pilot project in Kansas, 
Michigan, North Carolina and Wisconsin, designed to withhold taxes from remote sellers 
as a potential solution to the many logistical difficulties associated with e-tax collection 
at the point of consumption.  65
¶21 A similar point of consumption withholding tax scheme has been developed and 
advocated by Professor Doernberg.66  Under his proposal, commonly called the “Base 
Erosion Approach,” cross-border payments from a payor that is entitled to deduct the 
payment for its local tax purposes would be subject to a withholding tax regime.67  In 
Doernberg’s eyes, this approach would supplement, not completely replace, the current 
PE nexus principles.  Countries could still tax all nonresident businesses with a 
permanent establishment within their borders, but, in addition, a country where 
consumption occurred would also have the right to levy a withholding tax on payments 
with a source in that country to a non-resident (out of country) vendor.  In lieu of 
 
60 See Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 9, at 395. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 396. 
63 Id. 
64 See id. at 353. 
65 Id. at 387-390. 
66 See Doernberg, supra note 9, at 1022 (introducing the Base Erosion Approach). 
67 Id.  
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suffering the withholding tax, the non-resident payee could file a tax return in the host 
country (i.e., place of consumption) if that income were attributable to permanent 
establishment in that country.  Doernberg’s proposal has received backing from a number 
of commentators, perhaps most notably in a study commissioned by the government of 
India (“HPC Report”).    68
¶22 Much of the base erosion approach’s appeal lies in its simplicity and ease of 
enforcement.69  Only the cross-border payments that are deductible by the payer would be 
subject to withholding.  “Assuming that local deductions are contingent on withholding, 
this approach would offer a degree of self-enforcement because the local withholding 
agent would have a built-in incentive to withhold.”70  This approach also simplifies tax 
law by eliminating complex characterization and sourcing rules.  71
¶23 Another point of consumption, economic nexus solution is presented by Professor 
Avi-Yonah.72  His suggestion is a system where, once a foreign business’s sales within a 
jurisdiction reach a certain level, the foreign business could be taxed by the source 
jurisdiction.  This compensates the source jurisdiction for the costs borne to produce a 
healthy consumer base and supporting infrastructure that allows the business to function 
in the source jurisdiction.  As Arthur Cockfield points out, the primary challenge under 
such a system would be the establishment of a predetermined level of business, giving 
rise to a host country’s ability to tax a non-resident vendor.  73
¶24 Another proposal, in the vein of Cockfield’s suggestion that the new properties of 
the Internet be harnessed to counteract the challenges presented by the Internet, is a 
suggestion that countries enforce an e-commerce “bit tax” on non-resident companies 
making use of their market.74  Effectively, this proposal advocates taxes on non-resident 
business profits at the point of consumption, but the bit tax would not directly tax 
consumption, but instead, would tax the Internet activity leading to consumption. 
¶25 One final, and perhaps “looser,” point of consumption/economic nexus suggestion 
for revamping the traditional permanent establishment rules involves formulary 
appointment.75  This system argues that, as businesses create greater percentages of their 
value through intangible elements and Internet-enabled remote selling activity, 
appropriate percentages of income, as established by a mathematical formula, should be 
appointed as PE income in the state where consumption occurs.  This system, like those 
previously mentioned in this section, is conceptually based on the premise that point of 
consumption provides a more accurate allocation of taxing jurisdiction in light of modern 
commercial practices.  While the proposals discussed above work through what might be 
 
68 Report of the High-Powered Committee on (Indian) Electronic Commerce and Taxation, 77-78, at 
http://www.laws4india.com/indiantaxlaws/notification/ecomchapter2.pdf (Sept. 12, 2001) (last visited Nov. 
25, 2007) [hereinafter “HPC Report”] (supporting the Doernberg Base Erosion Approach with the caveats 
that (1) it should replace rather than supplement the current PE rules, and (2) it should apply to all 
commerce, not just e-commerce). 
69 See Doernberg, supra note 9, at 1017. 
70 Sprague & Hersey, supra note 2, at 309. 
71 Id.; see also HPC Report, supra note 68, Executive Summary at 15. 
72 See Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of E-Commerce, supra note 9. 
73 See Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 9 at 395-396. 
74 See Michael Mazerov, Making the Internet Tax Freedom Act Permanent in the Form Currently 
Proposed Would Lead to a Substantial Revenue Loss for States and Localities, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 20, 
2003, pp. 203-39. 
75 See McLure, supra note 9, at 418-419. 
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considered more direct taxes levied at the point of consumption, the formulary 
appointment method achieves a similar goal by utilizing a formula that applies greater 
weight to the country where consumption occurs. 
B.  Arguments for Maintaining the Current PE System 
¶26 While the vast majority of recent academic discourse has argued for revamping the 
current PE rules, the OECD has steadfastly adhered to the principles first developed in 
the 1920s by the League of Nations and later adopted into the Model Convention.  They, 
along with some assistance from many academics (including some authors suggesting PE 
retooling), have justified their continuing use of the current permanent establishment 
principles with four main arguments:  (1) the PE rules are conceptually correct, (2) there 
is little evidence supporting the tax avoidance and loss of revenue scenarios predicted by 
change advocates, (3) the PE rules are robust and flexible enough to handle the 
challenges of e-commerce, and (4) transfer pricing and other remedies are available to 
correct any inefficiencies caused by the existing rules.  76
¶27 Arguments touting the conceptual firmness of the PE system say that the current 
system allows a state to tax a foreign business that has a sufficient nexus with the state to 
justify the state to get a portion of the foreign business’s tax base.  E-commerce 
efficiencies shouldn’t undermine this assumption.77  The digital economy still requires 
businesses to utilize capital, labor, and other property to produce and market its products.  
Physical presence and activity — labor, property investment, assumption of risk — 
remain necessary for a business to market and sell its products and services.  Specifically,  
That a jurisdiction has customers which are available to make purchases from a 
foreign enterprise should not be given much weight as a policy matter in 
designing the tax nexus rules. This is because market accessibility does not 
indicate that a particular foreign enterprise has created value in that state. Selling 
into a market does not equate to an enterprise’s “participation in the economic 
life of a country.”  Instead, it reflects the enterprise’s “participation with the 
economic life of a country.”78
While e-commerce has changed the business world, the origin of wealth for businesses 
remains where it always has, at the place where the costs and risks to develop, produce, 
and distribute the products are borne.79
¶28 Arguments supporting the existing PE rules also point out a lack of empirical 
evidence suggesting their inability to respond to e-commerce challenges and also point 
out that those proposals supporting a direct tax nexus rely on the assumption that under 
the current PE rules, most e-commerce transactions would not be subject to taxation in 
the country of consumption.  It would not be reasonable to implement change until clear 
evidence of this scenario emerges.  With respect to remote sellers of consumer products, 
 
76 See Sprague & Hersey, supra note 2, at 311-322. 
77 OECD Model Convention 2003, supra note 3, at art. 7(1). 
78 Sprague & Hersey, supra note 2 at 312. 
79 Id. at 312. 
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empirics are showing that business without physical presence are generally not able to 
replicate the economic success of businesses that are physically established.  80
¶29 Those arguments showing a dearth of empirical evidence also suggest that the 
current PE system has already been able to adequately respond to the evolving modern 
marketplace.  The OECD has asserted that modest changes in international tax practice 
can be achieved through continuous interpretation of the existing rules as simple changes 
to the Commentary on Article 5 of the Model Convention have historically been used to 
account for new business realities.  81
¶30 Moreover, the permanent establishment rules are just part of a much larger 
international taxation system, and thus, there are other taxation principles where 
correcting for the challenges of the digital economy might make more sense.  For 
instance, attribution of profit to a PE based on arm’s length principles remains 
appropriate in an Internet-enabled economy: the growing use of e-commerce may create a 
situation where there is a lack of comparable transactions suitable for determining an 
arm’s length standard, yet there are few, if any, examples where current transfer pricing 
rules cannot be used to resolve the issue.  82
III.  PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT AS AN ACCESS TO MARKETS PROXY 
¶31 Each of the arguments highlighted in the previous section is based on the 
presumption that the current permanent establishment principles use “location of value 
production” as their conceptual basis.  While the history of the permanent establishment 
principle certainly supports that the permanent establishment principles were developed 
with location of value production as their conceptual root, scholars and tax policymakers 
have been perhaps too ready to accept location of value production as the only conceptual 
basis to the exclusion of other plausible justifications of the traditional permanent 
establishment principles.  This section will show how an alternative basis for the 
permanent establishment principles, an “access to markets proxy”, is supported by the 
historical literature surrounding the League of Nations’ formation of the early PE rules.  
This section then continues to show how this alternative, albeit small, shift in conceptual 
basis can be used to supplement the arguments for and against PE rule revision discussed 
in the previous section. 
¶32 As mentioned in a prior section, two fundamental theoretical underpinnings of the 
international tax system are the cost and benefit theories of taxation.  Sometimes pooled 
together under a larger “equivalence theory,”83 these principles hold that “the taxpayer 
should pay taxes equivalent to the benefits he has, or the expenses he causes, through the 
use of the infrastructure of a country, in particular the use of public goods and natural 
 
80 See Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition, supra note 12 (noting that it has been more difficult than initially 
expected for multi-national enterprises to avoid having permanent establishments by relying on e-
commerce); Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of E-Commerce, supra note 9, at 516. 
81 See OECD Model Convention, 2003, supra note 3, at arts. 5, 7(1), Introduction ¶ 35 (“changes or 
additions to the Commentaries are normally applicable to the interpretation and application of convention 
concluded before their adoption, because they reflect the consensus of the OECD Member countries as to 
the proper interpretation of existing provisions and their application to specific situations.”). 
82 Sprague & Hersey, supra note 2, at 311. 
83 See Skaar, supra note 13, at 24. 
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resources.”84  Thomas Sewell Adams, an architect of both early United States 
international taxation policy and the early League of Nations reports and resolutions first 
establishing the permanent establishment principles,85 echoes the sentiment of the 
equivalence theory: 
A large part of the cost of government is traceable to the necessity of maintaining 
a suitable business environment . . . .  Business is responsible for much of the 
work which occupies the courts, the police, the fire department, the army and the 
navy. New business creates new tasks, entails further public expense . . . .  The 
relationship between private business and the cost of government is a loose one . 
. . .  The connection, however, is real . . . .  Business ought to be taxed because it 
costs money to maintain a market and those costs should in some way be 
distributed over all the beneficiaries of that market.86
¶33 The equivalence theories were prized by American economists in the early part of 
the twentieth century, and were a salient influence on the League of Nations reports and 
model treaties where the concept of permanent establishment was first defined.  Many of 
these early League of Nations documents, discussing apportionment of taxing 
jurisdiction, do not use the term creation of value, but instead use “origin of wealth” 
terminology, meaning “all the stages which are involved up to the point of the wealth 
coming to fruition, that is, all the stages up to the point when the physical production has 
reached a complete economic destination and can be acquired as wealth.”  87
¶34 While the interpretation of the intent underlying the modern PE rules as being 
“creation of value” certainly seems like a valid reading, the terminology used in the early 
stages of PE rule development is sufficiently broad to allow the possibility that market 
access was a consideration at the time the rules were ordained.  Further, given the 
influence of American economists and tax theorists like T.S. Adams, a professed 
supporter of equivalence justifications for taxation, on the League of Nations reports, 
“location of value production” seems to be just one of many potential conceptual bases 
congruent with equivalence theories supporting the traditional PE rules.  Moreover, the 
“origin of wealth” phrasing and explanation given above, along with an obvious focus on 
market access by influential members of the League of Nations Technical Experts panel, 
would seem to go so far as supporting an argument that market access proxy was at least 
partial motivation for the resulting PE rules. 
¶35 The digital economy has changed all aspects of the business world — perhaps most 
notably, it has expanded markets for traditional brick and mortar businesses that have 
successfully made the change to “click and mortar” or even entirely digital businesses.88  
Just like “creation of value” once required a tangible presence, access to markets once 
required a physical presence (a store, for example).  While creation of value can now be 
 
84 Id. 
85 For a historical account of Adams’s impact on the shaping of twentieth century tax policy, see Graetz 
& O’Hear, supra note 18, at 1028-1041. 
86 Adams, supra note 28, at 187. 
87 1923 LON Report, supra note 20, at 23 (presenting report by Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman 
and Sir Josiah Stamp to Financial Committee of the League of Nations). 
88 See Aldo Forgione, Clicks and Mortar: Taxing Multinational Business Profits in the Digital Age, 26 
SEATTLE UNIV. L. R. 719, 722-23 (2003). 
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achieved by automated software functions bearing no relationship to geographic 
boundaries, the same can be said for businesses’ market access efforts.89  This subtle 
distinction between “location of value-creation” and a “market access” vantage also shifts 
consideration away from the existing arguments about e-commerce taxing jurisdiction 
and stimulates greater scrutiny of the activities used by e-tailers to market their products. 
¶36 Adding this market access proxy approach to the current debate featuring 
arguments for either revision or preservation of the traditional permanent establishment 
principles, in many cases, adds increased complexity and justification to proposals 
advocating reform.  For instance, approaching the traditional permanent establishment 
rules as having a conceptual foundation in market access proxy seems to directly support 
the reform efforts proposed by professor Avi-Yonah.90  Under the Avi-Yonah proposal, 
threshold levels of profits or sales of a non-resident business would trigger taxation by 
the host state.  This proposal has intuitive appeal from the location of value production 
perspective that value is only created in a jurisdiction when business reaches or exceeds 
certain pre-defined levels.  Stated a bit differently, the Avi-Yonah approach seems to use 
these pre-determined levels of business activity as a sort of proxy for determining when 
value is being created in a host country.  Thus, it is a small, if even subtle, jump to a 
market access proxy.  Such an approach, would, in the case of the Avi-Yonah proposal, 
reach essentially the same conclusion, though for a slightly different reason.  Rather than 
certain levels of sales triggering host state taxation because they implied a locus of value 
creation, the levels of sales would trigger taxation because they implied a sufficient 
access to the host state market to warrant taxation in that state. 
¶37 In the same way, a market access proxy approach seems to supplement arguments 
in favor of e-commerce bit taxes.91  Bits of information transmitted over the internet carry 
information — product information, account data, shipping addresses, etc. — essential to 
electronic commerce.  Situating bit tax proposals in the location of value creation 
principle would say that these bits serve as a sort of proxy for identifying value creation.  
Once a certain number of bits are associated with an out-of-state vendor, value creation is 
assumed in the host state, and taxing jurisdiction is allocated accordingly.  Again, the 
market access proxy is a small and subtle shift.  Rather than bits being used as a means of 
determining point of value creation, they serve as a means of determining market access 
for non-resident business in a host state.  Whereas in the pre-digital age, accessing a 
market would require a business to establish in a host state in some form or perhaps by 
sending agents into the host state, the same outcomes can now be achieved by sending 
bits of information via web into the host state.   
¶38 For these same reasons, the market access proxy approach seems to be a good fit 
with the Base Erosion Approach advocated by Professor Doernberg.92  The key principle 
in Doernberg’s proposal is that a direct tax nexus should exist whenever a foreign 
enterprise receives a payment from an in-country payor.  Since bits transmitted over the 
network can now accomplish the same goals that a tangible physical establishment could 
in the pre-digital age, including exchange of payment, taxation based on the access that 
 
89 See id.; Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 9, at 338. 
90 See Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition, supra note 12; Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of E-Commerce, 
supra note 9. 
91 See sources cited supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
92 See Doernberg, supra notes 9, 66, and accompanying text. 
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these bits provide the non-resident business to the host country market seems to fall under 
the same broad justifications supporting a base erosion approach. 
¶39 While the market access proxy justification appears to reasonably align tightly with 
many of the PE reform proposals, perhaps the most interesting comparison of how the 
market access approach differs from the value creation principles typically used to 
evaluate the permanent establishment principles is found in an application of the market 
access approach to the broad Cockfield point of consumption proposal.93  Cockfield notes 
a particular problem with the OECD’s revisions to the Model Convention Commentary 
that allow servers to rise to the level of a permanent establishment, saying that tax 
authorities will no longer ask what sort of taxable presence exists within each country, 
but instead will ask what type of economic activity is occurring in each country.94  
Approaching the issue from the market access proxy suggests that tax authorities should 
be questioning economic activity in exactly the fashion that Cockfield fears.  This is 
because the market access proxy approach supports many of the arguments forwarded by 
the OECD in favor of maintaining the current PE system with minor adjustments. 
¶40 Until recently, non-resident companies establishing an effective business presence 
in a host country most likely required some sort of physical presence, be it a retail 
location, a warehouse, or human agents, in order to access the host country’s market.  
The Internet has, as detailed throughout this paper, drastically reduced (and continues to 
further reduce) the physical presence needs of non-resident companies trying to access a 
host state market.  What formerly could only be achieved through physical presence, can 
now be achieved by ones and zeroes transmitted electronically via a loosely defined 
network.  Rather than asking if there is a physical presence in the country worthy of 
taxation, as Cockfield seems to advocate, the market access proxy approach cares little 
about actual presence but cares a lot about the activities whether physical or not that  
allow a business to access a host country’s market.  The key questions, under the market 
proxy approach, should not be, as Cockfield suggests, the amount of consumption in a 
host country market, but if the efforts taken by a non-resident company gave that 
company access to that market.  This is the line currently toed by the revised OECD 
Commentary to the Model Convention, and as it seems, a completely reasonable 
application of the permanent establishment principles as originally intended by the 
economists and tax policymakers establishing the PE rules nearly 80 years ago. 
¶41 The biggest justification to consider permanent establishment principles from an 
access to market point of view, however, may lie in the continued evolution of the 
Internet economy.  Commentators have already well documented the “disappearing of the 
taxpayer in Cyberspace,”95 detailing how under the current PE rules, producers are 
increasingly able to use the nebulous nature of the web to avoid or minimize tax 
liabilities.  Many of these same commentators have argued that the basis for taxing 
jurisdiction should be shifted to place of consumption.96  However, just as cyberspace has 
altered how businesses deliver products to consumers, making producers more “elusive” 
and less tangible, it has also fundamentally changed the traditional “properties” of 
consumers and has blurred where products are actually “consumed.”  Accordingly, 
 
93 See sources cited supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text. 
94 Cockfield, Digital Biosphere, supra note 9, at 391-392. 
95 Gárate, supra note 3, at 48. 
96 See discussion Part II, subsection A supra. 
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alterations to the current system of international taxation relying on point of consumption 
in a particular jurisdiction may be a short term solution to the challenges presented by 
businesses’ increased use of the Internet.  An access to market approach may provide a 
more dynamic system of allocating taxing jurisdiction that is able to better respond to 
continuing evolution of the Internet economy. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶42 Given the discussion of the prior section, it is probably helpful to pause and ask 
what adopting a market access proxy understanding of the permanent establishment rules 
accomplishes.  As noted in the prior section, changing from the traditional point of value 
creation characterization as the primary conceptual basis for the traditional PE rules and 
considering the added possibility that market access was a salient underlying theoretical 
justification of the rules does very little to challenge or change the current arguments for 
and against modifying the existing system of international taxation.  What is really gained 
by adding market access proxy to the discussion is that it presents an avenue to ensure 
that tax policy remains cognizant of real world norms and values.  When long-established 
legal principles of all sorts are being confronted with the new realities of the digital 
world, the subtle distinction between “location of value-creation” to a “market access” 
vantage also shifts consideration away from the existing arguments about e-commerce 
taxing jurisdiction and stimulates greater scrutiny of the activities used by e-tailers to 
market their products.   
¶43 The question of who should have jurisdiction to tax the profits of individuals and 
businesses conducting multi-national business via the Internet is just one example of 
where law developed in response to a traditional, tangible world intersects with the 
modern realities of cyberspace.  While the questions posed by this paper may not, at a 
glace, appear to drastically impact our daily lives, the principles derived from the current 
debate over taxation of electronic commerce will undoubtedly impact how law and policy 
are shaped in response to future technological advances.  The question of how to tax in 
the digital age has already stimulated questions about the relationship between real world 
and digital norms.  Continuing debate about the proper theoretical basis for the 
international tax system in an e-commerce world will help perfect our understanding of 
how technology impacts society in non-tax disciplines and may provide a greater 
understanding of cyberspace as a whole. 
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